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Abstract This paper reflects on the articles submitted for the Symposium
Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side. I discuss some of the criticisms of the
book’s theory and my treatment of hate speech. The responsibilities of Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) and Web-Hosting Services (WHSs) are in the fore,
arguing that as they are the gatekeepers, they need to be proactive far more
than they are now. This paper, like my book, strives to suggest an approach
that harnesses the strengths and capabilities of the public and the private sectors
in offering practical solutions to pressing problems.
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1 Introduction
The Internet’s design and raison d’être are complete freedom, but soon enough
people began to exploit the Net’s massive potential to enhance partisan inter-
ests, some of which are harmful and anti-social. Given that the Internet has
been part of our lives for a relatively short time, the discussions about the costs
and harms of the Internet, and how to address them, are in their infancy. The
transnational nature of the World-Wide-Web makes regulation very difficult, if
not impossible.
The articles in this volume reflect on some aspects of the theory invoked in of
Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side, on the role of Internet intermediaries, and on the
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lingering problem of hate speech. In this paper, I intend to critically reflect on some of
the arguments and to expand on the book’s reasoning.
2 Theory
In his article, BBusiness Ethics and Free Speech on the Internet^, Brian Berkey
provides much food for thought. He seems to accept that John Stuart Mill’s theory
can be a good starting point to discuss freedom of expression on the Internet. He
wants to deduce from Mill whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web-
Hosting Services (WHSs) ought to deny service to those who would engage in
online hate speech. But he takes Mill’s position too literary with not enough
consideration to the dramatic technological and media developments that have
taken place since Mill wrote On Liberty in 1869. In another article (Cohen-
Almagor 2012) I explained that Mill wrote at a time when there was no mass
media. All there was were a few newspapers, read only by the elite. Today the
situation is very different. People have access to newspapers, radio, television, the
Internet, cell phones, and other technological means of communication that togeth-
er influence and shape to one extent or another the reality in which we live.
Together these means of mass communication can create and reinforce an atmo-
sphere of incitement. Dozens of calls for hatred and violence might create a
turbulent atmosphere that is conducive to violence. Frequently, inciting speech,
even if repeated and magnified by the media, falls on deaf ears. Sometimes,
however, such speech falls on eager ears and can be a factor in inducing the
already-persuaded that there is a need to take action; i.e., to move from harmful
speech to harmful deeds. It is one thing to throw a lighted cigarette into an empty
bin and quite another to throw it in a dry field. As Zechariah Chafee (1946: 397)
stated: BSmoking is all right, but not in a powder magazine.^
3 The Role of Internet Intermediaries
The authors of BThe Psychology of Social Networking: The Challenges of Social
Networking for Fame-Valuing Teens' Body Image^ argue that social networking seems
to satisfy some adolescent developmental needs. First, it allows teens to practice
identity establishment through performing self-expression and self-presentation tasks.
Second, it provides opportunities for youth to seek social approval from others.
Furthermore, adolescents have a strong attraction and aspiration to fame, which has
become one of the most highly appreciated values for this age group. Tali Te’enu-
Harari and Keren Eyal conclude that youth’s exposure to thin-idealizing content posted
by their adored celebrities on interactive and highly engaging social networking sites
poses potential challenges for these young, developing individuals and therefore social
networking sites should adopt basic norms of moral and social responsibility. This
recommendation is hammered time and again in Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side.
In my book, I argued that Internet intermediaries should not be equated with
telephone service providers or with electric service providers. I explained the major
technical differences as well as differences in scope and potential impact. Professor
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Berkey criticises me for failing to explain why any of these differences are morally
important. I should have made the point clearer. The technological differences are of
functional, practical importance. The possibilities that the Internet is offering exceed by
far those that are made available by the telephone providers. The Internet cannot be
seen as mere electric grid. While these differences are not necessarily morally signif-
icant, the practical implications of Internet abuse are certainly morally significant.
Therefore I insist that Internet intermediaries should be more responsible and more
proactive in ensuring safe use of this innovative and transformative information
platform.
After refuting the telephone provider and the electric grid analogies, I went
on to offer what I believe are better analogies to understand social responsibil-
ity on the Internet. I have argued that better analogies are those between the
Internet and a large first and second hand bookstore, or between the Internet
and a large library. An owner of a bookstore cannot be held responsible for the
content of each and every book in her store. She does not read and inspect all
the books. Similarly, it can be argued, an Internet provider should not be held
accountable for content on its server. But if a bookstore owner is informed that
a specific book contains child pornography, some other illegal material, or
material that violates copyright, and she does not take the book off the shelves,
then the owner may be held legally responsible for violation of the law. And
she is also morally responsible. Similarly, it can be argued, is the case on the
Internet. ISPs and WHSs have discretion whether their services are opened for
all or limited in one way or another.
Bookstore owners do have discretion about the books they offer for buyers.
Many would like to maintain a quiet and tranquil atmosphere in the store. The
books, accordingly, will be for the general readership. Other book owners might
opt for a more rowdy atmosphere. They will entertain books of socially
problematic material. The likely result would be that the general readership
would refrain from visiting those bookstores. Those stores would become niche
stores, for particular readers.
In both kinds of store, their owners would like to keep the business going.
They will listen to warnings about the illegality of certain books. The same, it
can be argued, is true of ISPs and WHSs: Provide a notice first, allowing the
provider to make a decision about the consequences to which she might be held
liable. If the provider/host does not act upon the warning, then it will have to
face the consequences. Indeed, on copyrights issues ISPs are expected to assume
responsibility. They should also assume moral and social responsibility when
violent, anti-social activities are taking place on their servers. Most ISPs and
web-hosting companies would not like their servers to be transformed into
forums in which people concoct criminal activities.
Professor Berkey offers several criticisms with regard to this analogy. First, the
discretion that bookstore owners is quite wide, wider than what he would like Internet
intermediaries to have. For instance, bookstore owners may operate religious stores that
sell only books of one religion or they may opt to sell only books of a certain
ideological leaning. I would certainly not wish to see ISPs that adapt only one
conception of the good. Having said that, I did mention in my book the possibility of
niche bookstores with the immediate implications of being a niche.
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Professor Berkey further argues that in my view Internet intermediaries are permitted
to discriminate only against hate speech. This is incorrect. Throughout my book, I
argued that ISPs and WHSs should adopt responsible standards of conduct to protect
Netusers from the harms of cyber bullying, terror, crime and hate speech.
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web-Hosting Services (WHSs) have become
major actors in shaping the informational environment and in influencing users’
experiences and interactions within it. They provide open infrastructure and applica-
tions that facilitate digital expression, interaction, and the communication of informa-
tion. I argue that Internet intermediaries have social responsibility to the public they
serve. They are trustees of the greater good. Gatekeeping entails promoting of an
ethical and responsible informational environment in which users can surf the Internet
safely and in a way that support the common good.
In August 2016, the UK Home Affairs Committee published a report on extrem-
ism which affects Muslim communities and arising from the activities of terrorist
organisations such as Daesh. The report recommends that the government adopt a
sophisticated approach both to identifying the factors which instigate radicalisation
and in the measures it takes to tackle radicalisation. The report includes many
detailed recommendations about the work of the Metropolitan Police’s Counter
Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) and the Europol, the PREVENT strategy
and border security; it probes the role of communities, media and technology, aiming
to contain radicalization and promote security and peace of mind (House of
Commons Home Affairs Committee 2016).
When discussing the role of the Internet and social media in facilitating and
encouraging terror, the reiterated theme in the report is responsibility. The fight against
radicalization and terror requires cooperation of all pertinent stakeholders and shared
responsibility to take adequate measures to prevent violence.
The report holds that BSocial media companies are consciously failing to combat the
use of their sites to promote terrorism and killings. Networks like Facebook, Twitter
and YouTube are the vehicle of choice in spreading propaganda and they have become
the recruiting platforms for terrorism. They must accept that the hundreds of millions in
revenues generated from billions of people using their products needs to be accompa-
nied by a greater sense of responsibility and ownership for the impact that extremist
material on their sites is having^ (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2016).
The report calls for a zero tolerance approach to online extremism, including entice-
ment to join extremist groups or commit attacks of terror and any glorification of such
activities. The report recommends that manuals for terrorists and extremists should be
removed from the Internet.
The report voiced dismay that social media companies have teams of only a few
hundred employees to monitor networks of billions of accounts and that Twitter does
not even proactively report extremist content to law enforcement agencies. The report
says that Bthese companies are hiding behind their supranational legal status to pass the
parcel of responsibility and refusing to act responsibly in case they damage their
brands. If they continue to fail to tackle this issue and allow their platforms to become
the ‘Wild West’ of the Internet, then it will erode their reputation as responsible
operators^ (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2016).
These are bold and correct statements. The only reservation I have is with regard to
the claim that their conduct Bwill erode their reputation as responsible operators^. I do
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not think that these companies have tried to gain such a reputation and consequently
they were never regarded as responsible by people who have been studying political
extremism and terror on the Internet. During the past decade I spoke with dozens of
security officers in the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and Israel. They all voiced their
growing frustration with the free speech, neutral attitude adopted by the media giants.
Twitter has the most expansive boundaries to freedom of expression. Its terms of
service state that BAll Content, whether publicly posted or privately transmitted, is the
sole responsibility of the person who originated such Content. We may not monitor or
control the Content posted via the Services and, we cannot take responsibility for such
Content. Any use or reliance on any Content or materials posted via the Services or
obtained by you through the Services is at your own risk^.1 Twitter does have some
rules that prescribe content in limited circumstances. 2 Holocaust denial and, more
broadly hate speech do not count among those circumstances.
YouTube community guidelines include reference to hateful content. It says:
4 Hateful Content
Our products are platforms for free expression. But we don't support content that
promotes or condones violence against individuals or groups based on race or
ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, nationality, veteran status, or sexual
orientation/gender identity, or whose primary purpose is inciting hatred on the
basis of these core characteristics. This can be a delicate balancing act, but if the
primary purpose is to attack a protected group, the content crosses the line.3 Yet
on YouTube one may find BThe ‘Holohoax’ exposed in 30 minutes^ 4 and a
number of other BHolhoax^ videos, including the Leuchter Report5 and a string of
23 clips whose common theme is Bno single Jew died in a gas chamber .^6
Facebook prohibits posting content that is hateful or threatening. Facebook disabled a
group called ‘I Hate Muslims in Oz.’ Barry Schnitt explained: BWe disabled the ‘I Hate
Muslims in Oz’ group… because it contained an explicit statement of hate. Where
Holocaust-denial groups have done this and been reported, we’ve taken the same
action^ (Matyszczyk 2009). In May 2010, Facebook took down a page titled BKill a
Jew Day,^ which urged Netusers to violence Banywhere you see a Jew^ between July 4
and July 22.
1 Twitter Terms of Service, https://twitter.com/tos
2 The Twitter Rules, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules
3 Respect the YouTube community, http://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/communityguidelines.html
4 BThe ‘Holohoax’ exposed in 30 min^, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpjqf-vNq6I
5 The Leuchter Report, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLQv_UQ2mJ0&list=PL2zouJfRSfG52G5
LVQwLOD6nj4Ji8l7wE
6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CsrPt-enplw&list=PLiEJsoZExlCyYwzGLQqwMTT8hvwfI5WYj
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Facebook distinguishes between ‘explicit statement of hate’ and Holocaust denial. Its
directors believe that Holocaust denial is not hateful per se and does not therefore
contravene the company’s terms of service. The terms of service say: BYou will not post
content that is hateful, threatening, pornographic, or that contains nudity or graphic or
gratuitous violence^.7 Facebook still hosts the National Association for the Advance-
ment of White People. 8 Facebook said that BWe think it's important to maintain
consistency in our policies, which don't generally prohibit people from making state-
ments about historical events, no matter how ignorant the statement or how awful the
event^ (Grossman 2011). How can this stance be reconciled with Facebook prohibition
on posting content that is hateful or threatening is something for the Facebook
managers to reckon with and answer.
5 Hate Speech
Hate speech is a contested topic and the extent that it is debated is exemplified in the
articles in this symposium. While Brian Berkey thinks that my intolerance of hate
speech is exaggerated, Bhikhu Parekh is inclined to go further than me and insist on not
tolerating the bigot at all. I shall first avail myself to discuss Parekh’s critique and then
move on to consider Professor Berkey’s arguments.
Lord Professor Parekh argues that hate speech is objectionable for both intrinsic and
instrumental reasons. He counts the various harms that hate speech inflicts on its targets
and rightly explains that the danger of hate speech should be assessed against the
prevailing social climate and the lessons from history. Parekh brings the example of a
radical group that urges people to kill all elderly parents or all beautiful women. Its
intended audience as well as well as its target group would consider this urging as mad
or as a poor joke and would dismiss this utterance. But if similar sentiments are
expressed about blacks, Jews, or gays, then they would be seriously considered. This
is because of the deeply rooted prejudices against these groups, and because the lessons
we have learned from history.
Lord Parekh is right. We assess the legitimacy of expressions in accordance with
social and historical data. To give another example: If someone were to express the
thought: Jews should be gassed during the 1920s, the utterance would be dismissed as
ridiculous, crazy and also impractical thought. What does it mean gas all the Jews?
How is this possible? Even if the audience were to be deeply anti-Semitic, they would
still question the validity and practicality of this suggestion to gas all Jews.
Today, after the horror of the holocaust, the same statement is likely to evoke strong
negative public reaction. The assertion would no longer be dismissed as mad but would
be taken most seriously. We do learn some lessons.
Lord Parekh speaks in support of a law that would ban hate speech. I addressed the
issue in my 2012 article and find myself in much agreement with my good friend
Bhikhu. Like him, I think that we have to fight against hate and bigotry. Like him, I
think that hate speech has no place in a decent society and deserves to be discouraged.
7 See http://www.facebook.com/terms.php
8 http://www.facebook.com/pages/The-National-Association-for-the-Advancement-of-White-
People/102208269835141
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Like him I believe there is room to invoke restrictive laws as last resort, after exhausting
educational, social and moral means. Parekh and I (and also Waldron 2012) believe that
hate speech legislation should protect people’s dignity against assault. It should aim to
protect the targets’ equal status in the community, their entitlement to basic justice and
to the fundamentals of their reputation. Parekh and I speak of maintaining civility and
human dignity. A person’s dignity relates to people’s social standing, the fundamentals
of basic reputation that entitle them to be treated as equals in society. Hate speech aims
to undermine its target’s reputation by associating characteristics like race, ethnicity or
religion with attributes that would disqualify them from enjoying equal standing in
society. Hate speech undercut the targets’ entitlement to basic justice and to the
fundamentals of their reputation. As students of history, it would be utterly irrespon-
sible on our part to turn a blind eye, legitimize or condone in one way or another the
existence of such discriminatory, indeed evil talk in society. As Parekh rightly notes, we
may differ in our view as to when is time to invoke such laws. We both use the term
Blast resort^ but we may differ in our understanding when the time comes to see the
necessity in such laws. It seems to me that Parekh would see the necessity of such laws
in an earlier stage. When hate speech is concerned, he would be inclined to weigh
freedom of expression less favourably than the competing interests of protecting
minorities and maintaining civility.
Lord Parekh and I share concerns regarding the marketplace of ideas concept. Both
of us are cognizant of its limitations.9 Parekh writes that he is Ba little troubled^ by my
Bheavy reliance on the Millian Principle of interfering with an individual only when his
or her utterances and actions threaten to cause harm to others^. This is because this
view puts the onus not on the speaker but on his target group, and in so doing places the
latter at disadvantage. Second, because harm is not easy to define, identify and prove.
He says that I am right to insist that Bexaggerated and ill-focused remarks about harm
should not be made the basis of actions on the internet or elsewhere, but the opposite
extreme of requiring a fairly precise casual connection between a particular form of
hate speech and a particular kind of harm would not do either .^ It seems that Parekh
sees no value in being tolerant to hate speech. He does not think that such restrictions
would go against the spirit of democracy. Quite the opposite. Restrictions on hate
speech would benefit democracy and society.
Professor Berkey, on the other hand, argues that my definition of hate speech is
overly broad though in one sense it is curiously narrow. In my book, hate speech is
defined as a bias-motivated, hostile, malicious speech aimed at a person or a group of
people because of some of their actual or perceived innate characteristics. It expresses
discriminatory, intimidating, disapproving, antagonistic and/or prejudicial attitudes
toward the disliked target group (Cohen-Almagor 2015). Berkey thinks that this
definition is broad because a great deal of speech is bias motivated, hostile and
malicious, and not all of it amounts to hate speech. In his example, Jane watches a
video featuring an African American artist performing a violent song. Jane, who is a
white woman, does not like it and she posts online comment saying that the artist
should be in prison. Professor Berkey rightly says that this comment is bias motivated,
hostile and malicious but it is not hate speech. I agree with Berkey. It is not hate speech
because it is not aimed at the artist due to his actual or perceived innate characteristics.
9 On this issue, see Pole (1994, 2000).
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Professor Berkey then considers Jim who posts the following comment: BScientific
evidence shows that members of racial group A are naturally more intelligent than
members of racial group B^. The statement might be morally repugnant but, Berkey
argues, it does not amount hate speech. Now this is an interesting example.
For many years, I have been presenting to my students the case of Jean-Philippe
Rushton, a Canadian psychology professor who has argued about hierarchy of races:
Asians are smarter than whites, who are in turn smarter than blacks. In his book Race,
Evolution, and Behavior (1999) Rushton explained that brain and genital size are
inversely related, and that races differ in brain size, intelligence, sexual behaviour,
fertility, personality, maturation, lifespan, crime and in family stability. He explained
that blacks are less intelligent than Orientals and Whites and they are more involved in
criminal activities. While the IQ of Orientals is about 106, the IQ of Black people is
around 70 to 75. Black people are also more sexually promiscuous and they lack social
organization. Here are some quotes from his book:
On average, Orientals are slower to mature, less fertile and less sexually active,
have larger brains and higher IQ scores. Blacks are at the opposite end in each of
these areas. Whites fall in the middle, often close to Orientals (p. 18).
Blacks are more aggressive and outgoing than Whites, while Whites are more
aggressive and outgoing than Orientals. Blacks also have more mental instability
than Whites. Black rates of drug and alcohol abuse are higher (pp. 33-34).
Orientals have about 102 million more brain cells than Whites, and… Whites
have about 480 million more than Blacks. These differences in brain size
probably explain the racial differences in IQ and cultural achievement (p. 58).
… the difference in average crime rate means that a much higher percentage of
Blacks fall into a life of crime. The 85 average IQ of criminals is almost identical
with the 85 average IQ of Blacks, so IQ is related to crime (pp. 94-95).
The science behind these assertions is debatable. Rushton’s theory evoked much
criticism and has been perceived as racist (Zuckerman and Brody 1988; Anderson
1991; Allemang 2012). His theory attempts to explain everything by the sole criterion
of race. It ignores social circumstances and social construction. It does not take into
account other, no less important factors, such as individual abilities, class, poverty,
education and family infrastructure. But is it hate speech? In the spirit of the liberal
marketplace of ideas, the search for the truth and open disputation of ideas with
contrasting ideas, one may think that Rushton’s theory is problematic but it should
be tolerated and debated. Its scientific facade needs to be exposed and simultaneously
the true motives that guide Rushton should be explored. This, indeed, is my belief.
Rushton’s theory is a hard case. It is opened to interpretations but it should not be
silenced.
I also believe that Rushton’s theory was not guided only by scientific methods, that it
had underpinning agenda which was not innocent, that it was motivated by other
reasons rather than the urge to discover a scientific truth. Rushton (1999, 104) was
asked BWeren’t theories about race differences the reason for racism, genocide and the
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Holocaust?^ Rushton answered (1999, 104-105): BThe Nazis and others used their
supposed racial superiority to justify war and genocide. But just about every idea -
nationalism, religion, egalitarianism, even self-defence - has been used as an excuse for
war, oppression or genocide. Science, however, is objective. It can’t give us our goals,
but it can tell us how easy or difficult it will be to reach our goal. Knowing more about
race differences may help us to give every child the best possible education and help us
to understand some of our chronic social problems better .^
With this answer, Rushton was trivializing the Nazi crimes. Nazism was equated
with nationalism, religion, egalitarianism, Beven self-defence^. Rushton says nothing
about the evil ideas of Nazism per se but how they were used for evil deeds, in the same
way that other ideas, including noble ideas such as egalitarianism and well-established
ideas such as self-defence, have been used for evil deeds. Then Rushton declares that
his science is objective. His commitment is to scientific truth, no matter how crude that
truth might be. And then he goes on to argue that his ideas may better children
education. But surely not the education of every child. No matter how much you invest
in the education of black children, they would not be able to escape their lot. They
belong to the inferior race and therefore they are doomed to suffer the consequences of
their brute luck.
What can help us understand Rushton’s reasoning is his behaviour and conduct
outside the scientific world. Rushton was embraced by anti-black associations, by
racists and bigots. Rushton not only did not flinch; he accepted their attention and
the honour of being their star scientist. In 2002, Rushton was appointed president of the
Pioneer Fund, which has for decades funded dubious studies linking race to character-
istics like criminality, sexuality and intelligence. Pioneer has long promoted eugenics,
or the Bscience^ of creating Bbetter^ humans through selective breeding. Set up in 1937
and headed by Nazi sympathizers, the Pioneer Fund’s mission was "to advance the
scientific study of heredity and human differences^.10 It strove to improve the character
of the American people through eugenics and procreation by people of white colonial
stock. Rushton has spoken on the alleged IQ deficiencies of minorities at conferences
of the racist American Renaissance magazine and website, and he has published a
number of articles in the group’s newsletter. His work is often published on racist
websites, including the anti-immigrant hate site, Vdare.com.11 While appearing before
and in support of racist groups, the above-mentioned sensitive and debatable statements
then amount to hate speech. The context, as we learned from JS Mill’s theory on liberty
(1948), makes a great difference. A questionable race theory when invoked in radical
extremist rallies is the fuel for their raging hatred, the validating force for their twisted
beliefs, the scientific cloth that legitimized crude beliefs about hierarchy of races.
Expressed in such forums, Rushton’s ideas become hate speech.
Professor Berkey maintains that my definition of hate speech appears to exclude
speech that intuitively should count as hate speech. This is because of the requirement
that the speech in question is directed against individuals or groups because of actual or
perceived innate characteristics. Berkey understands that as a result hate speech against
religious groups cannot be defined as hate speech. By innate characteristics I meant a
10 Pioneer Fund, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Pioneer_Fund
11 SPLC, Jean-Philippe Rushton, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/jean-
philippe-rushton
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quality or ability that one is born with to be distinguished from a quality or ability one
that have learned. Thus hateful speech against religious people would certainly fall
within the definition of hate speech. True, people are free to change their religion. They
also free to change their sex and/or nationality, as some indeed do. But they are unable
to change the past.
Hate speech is harmful and dangerous. It may have, indeed it has, significant effect
on the lives of targeted groups. In Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side I emphasised
the connection between hate speech and hate crime. Bigots, inspired by what they have
read online, went on to inflict violence on their targets. I am not going to repeat the
evidence provided in the book. Here I want to highlight the connection between hate
groups and biochemical warfare. Hate groups have talked for years about using anthrax
to strike at the U.S. government. Chemical and biological warfare can result in many
casualties, an attractive proposition for hate mongers who opt for harmful action. In
1995, Larry Wayne Harris, a microbiologist and former member of the Aryan Nations,
was arrested in Ohio with three vials of bubonic plague toxin he had ordered fraudu-
lently by mail from a supplier in Maryland. He was given 18 months on probation. He
wrote "Bacteriological Warfare: A Major Threat to North America,^ which may be
considered a how-to book. The FBI found legal veterinary anthrax vaccine in the trunk
of his car (Slevin 2001a, b).
The same year, 1995, members of the Patriot’s Council were arrested in Minne-
sota and charged with manufacturing ricin, a deadly biochemical substance, to kill
law enforcement officers. In 1998, members of a Texas anti-government group were
charged with plotting to infect people with cactus needles dipped in anthrax or the
AIDS virus (Slevin 2001a, b). Alexander James Curtis, arrested in 2001 in San
Diego on charges of harassing civil rights leaders and vandalizing two synagogues,
published an Internet guide in 2000 called BBiology for Aryans^ that described the
use of botulism, anthrax and typhoid for terror. Curtis had extensive Internet
connections in which he kept in touch with like-minded individuals and had spread
his message of intolerance nationwide (Perry 2000). Curtis also published the
monthly Nationalist Observer on the Internet and offered a weekly and daily
telephone broadcast and a racist Internet magazine in which he advocated biological
terrorism and celebrated Blone wolves^ such as Timothy McVeigh and Buford
Furrow. Indicted with Curtis were three men who met him through his extensive
websites dedicated to preaching racial superiority and violence: Michael Brian
DaSilva, 21; Robert Nicol Morehouse, 53; and Kevin Christopher Holland, 22.
The four defendants were charged with violating federal civil rights and hate-crime
laws that make it illegal to target someone for mistreatment on the basis of race,
religion or national origin (Perry and Murphy 2000; Web-Based White Supremacist
and followers charged with hate crimes 2000).
Other dangerous publications are BBiotoxic Weapons^ and BAdvanced Bio-
logical Weapons Design and Manufacture.^ These are virtual cookbooks for
anthrax and other biological weapons. Each states it is Bfor academic purposes
only.^ The author, Timothy Tobiason, was selling his self-published books and
compact discs at gun shows for years. Raymond A. Zilinskas, a senior scientist
at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California., said, Bhe
does give some accurate information on how to process spores that I have not
seen anywhere else in the open literature’ (Thomas 2001). In brackets I should
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mention that cryptome.org posts in the name of freedom of information dan-
gerous material, including a detailed patent of ricin. 12 And the Los Alamos
Primer published documents of the energy department containing what is
needed in order to produce an atomic bomb (Serber 1992). This is protected
speech under the First Amendment. In this era of global terrorism and nuclear
proliferation, I question whether this is also a responsible speech.
While my approach prefers adopting standards of civility and social responsi-
bility by all stakeholders – Netusers who upload information onto the Net, readers,
Internet gatekeepers, countries and the international community at large, and while
I see the need for legislation as a last resort after exhausting all other methods
short of legislation (education, open debate, deliberative procedures facilitate by
the media, discussions and consultations with the Internet industry), Amos N.
Guiora argues for legislation. Given the demonstrated impact of social media on
our daily lives, Guiora contends that a values–based approach must be buttressed
by legal standards and limits. Adopting and re-articulation the American Bran-
denburg test,13 Guiora calls for limiting social media speech because we can no
longer afford to ignore the harm posed by Internet hate speech. Postings on social
media must be assessed on a sliding scale taking into account multiple factors
including magnitude, frequency, intent of the platform, and content of the post and
platform.
6 Conclusion
Why do people differ in their view of such balancing? We are all products of our
education and upbringing. We are social beings, influenced by what we witness in our
societies, and the values enshrined in our families, significant other group, culture and
nation. Freedom of expression is perceived quite differently in the USA, India and in
Israel. I think the perception of free speech in Israel is somewhere between India and
the USA, probably closer to the American view than to the Indian view.
In his critique of the American First Amendment position, Jeremy Waldron notes
(2012, 185) that Britain has laws that prohibit racial and religious hatred (Public Order
Act 1986) and racial discrimination (Race Relations Act 1976). Hate speech laws aim
to protect the public good of dignity-based assurance, and to block the construction of
the rival public good that the racists and Islamophobes are seeking to construct among
themselves (Waldron 2012, 95). Are these laws illegitimate? Was their enactment
inappropriate and their enforcement morally wrong? Furthermore, almost all democra-
cies have hate speech laws. Are they all wrong and only the United States, which
protects hate speech, is right?14
My book tries to balance one against the other two important principles: freedom of
expression and social responsibility. The forefathers of the Internet had the vision of
creating a free highway, a public space where everyone can say what he or she has in
mind. This wonderful innovation of unfettered platform has backfired. The Internet is
12 http://cryptome.org/ricin-patent.pdf
13 Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444
14 For opposing argument articulating the importance of the First Amendment, see Baker (2009, 2012).
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open for use and abuse. We should provide and promote responsible use and we should
also fight against those who abuse. The abuse corrupt public space and has posed many
challenges on all levels: individual, the community, the state and the international
community. We are in the early stages of learning how to cope and how to combat
the abuse. Slowly we are developing the necessary tools to enjoy innovation and
freedom while, at the same time, we are adopting safeguards and rules of responsible
conduct. In my book, I made a distinction between Netusers and Netcitizens. The term
BNetuser^ refers to people who use the Internet. It is a neutral term. It does not convey
any clue as to how people use the Internet. It does not suggest any appraisal of their use.
On the other hand, the term Bnetcitizen^ as it is employed here is not neutral. It
describes a responsible use of the Internet. Netcitizens are people who use the
Internet as an integral part of their real life. That is to say, their virtual life is not
separated from their real life. Even if they invent an identity for themselves on
social networks, they do it in a responsible manner. They still hold themselves
accountable for the consequences of their Internet use. In other words, netcitizens
are good citizens of the Internet. They contribute to the Internet’s use and growth
while making an effort to ensure that their communications and Net use are
constructive. They foster free speech, open access and social culture of respecting
others, and of not harming others. Netcitizens are Netusers with a sense of
responsibility.
While a great deal is dependent on how we use the Internet, a great deal is also
dependent on the Internet gatekeepers. These companies possess immense power.
Sometimes it has been said that Facebook and Google have more power than presidents
and prime ministers. I do not think that this statement is exaggerated. Power without
responsibility is dangerous. Power without responsibility is corrosive. Power without
responsibility undermines our well-being. Therefore we must insist that Internet inter-
mediaries will take responsibility and ensure that Netusers will be able to enjoy the vast
capabilities of the Internet without putting themselves in danger. The Internet’s way
should not be in harm’s way. The Internet’s way should be enlightening, innovative,
entertaining, productive, voicing the best of humanity. To enable this, boundaries
should be introduced, antisocial and violent activities should be curbed, safe environ-
ment should be established. This is a combined effort of Netusers, business, countries
and the international community at large.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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